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Producers in a perfectly competitive industry compete to obtain shelf space
at the retail level. Barring contract observability problems, slotting allowances
are observed in equilibrium. Producers charge a high wholesale price, but give
back their profits via up-front payments to retailers. However, if the individual
supplier - retailer wholesale price terms are unobservable by competitors, then
resale price maintenance will be seen, but the coverage will not be universal.
The equilibria can be ranked by the usual social welfare criteria. Resale
price maintenance, though worse than simple marginal cost wholesale pricing,
yields greater surplus than the slotting allowance equilibrium.
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Shelf space at the retail level is becoming increasingly scarce. Although the number of
products sold by the average grocery store has grown from 11,800 to 20,000 in the last ten
years, the number of new product introductions has increased from 2,600 per year in 1978
to 10,200 per year in 1987.1 Retailers are now confronted by more product categories and
more brands per category than ever before.2
Coupled with high local retailing concentration, this product proliferation has shifted
the balance of power away from manufacturers and led to increased competition among
producers for the limited amount of store space.3 Evidence of such competition may be
inferred from the growing incidence of slotting allowances (shelf space rental fees) during the
past decade. This practice, and the use of resale price maintenance (RPM) to obtain shelf
space, will be the focus of this paper.
Slotting allowances, also known as street money or placement allowances, are fees paid
by manufacturers to obtain retailer patronage. They may be cash gifts or payments in kind,
such as cases of free goods. Either way, their salient characteristic is that the fee paid does
not vary with subsequent retailer sales.
Although payment of fees to retailers has been documented at least as far back as the A
& P case in the 1930's, and free cases of goods as well as other forms of shelf space rivalry
have been around for a long time, there seems to have been an increase in the magnitude of
'Chicago Tribune (1988).2Fr example, in the Los Angeles area alone, there are 15 varieties of green peas, 19 different kinds of
mustard, 12 brands of frozen pizza, etc., all vying for shelf space.
sPorter (1976) estimates that an average of two to five retailers per industry operate in any given local
market. A wave of mergers since then has further increased concentration. See Johnson (1987), chapters 4
and 8.
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the allowances during the last ten years.4 Unfortunately these fees are negotiated orally and
in private and hence public data is non-existent. However recent trade press articles quote
industry sources suggesting the practice accounts for 1/3 to 1/2 of the $19 billion spent by
producers on trade promotions in 1987. Some warehouses and grocery chains are said to be
demanding up to $100,000 for each product stocked.5 The shelf space shortage appears to
be most acute among frozen foods, dairy products, and microwavable shelf stable foods.
RPM, a restraint imposed by a manufacturer on his dealers which restricts the price at
which his product may be resold, has been per se illegal since 1975. But because current
economic theories of RPM are based on efficiency explanations such as information free -
riding and dealer service repair externalities, the Department of Justice recently argued in
its amicus brief in the Spray-Rite v. Monsanto (1984) case that RPM was unsuitable for
per se treatment. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Business Electronics
v. Sharp Electronics (1988) tacitly allows for products to be price maintained.6
One of the themes of this paper is that RPM is consistent with shelf space rivalry. In
providing a means for retailers to commit contractually to high prices, a manufacturer can in-
directly raise retailer profits by eliminating their incentive for aggressive downstream pricing.
Although manufacturers would prefer lower retail prices and higher sales, the competition
among themselves for the scarce shelf space provides the incentive for such contracts. Unlike
the free - riding and dealer epair service theories, this explanation does not rely on the com-
plexity of the product. When it was legal, the practice was used for both technical products
4Perhaps this is due to the Reagan administration's lenient interpretation and enforcement of the price
discrimination laws.
sSee Advertising Age (1987) and the Wall Street Journal (1988).
6The court ruled that a manufacturer's agreement with high - priced dealers to stop supplying discounters
is not necessarily an antitrust violation. See New York Times (1988).
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as well as convenience goods, with the majority of items having been sold in drug stores and
supermarkets.
This paper provides an equilibrium analysis of both RPM and slotting allowances. Each
practice serves to increase retailer profits. At first blush, shelf space rental fees appear to
be innocuous since pure transfers of profit between industries have no welfare consequence.
However this implicitly assumes that the sum of producer and retailer industry profits is fixed.
In general this will not be true. Manufacturers are in competition with each other to obtain
retailer patronage and retailers compete among themselves to obtain customer favor. Slotting
allowances, by lessening competition at the retail level, serve to increase the profit pie. Since
manufacturers must earn non-negative profits, slotting allowance contracts coincide with
per-unit wholesale prices which are above production marginal cost. Retailers who sign such
contracts not only receive a direct up-front payment but also benefit indirectly from the
reduced downstream price competition. By committing to a relatively high wholesale cost,
a retail firm essentially announces its intention to be less aggressive in its pricing. Other
firms are induced to raise their retail prices and the original firm gains through the feedback
effects.7
The main thrust of this paper is that RPM and slotting allowances may have anticompet-
itive effects. Since both are contractual provisions which can raise retailer prices and profits,
they may be added to the class of facilitating practices.8 The sine qua non of these practices
is the profitability of the independent rational reactions of one's rivals. In the slotting al-
lowances case, each manufacturer raises the wholesale price to his retailer thereby commiting
7This is the familiar puppy - dog strategy. See Fudenburg and Tirole (1984). I'ma assuming of course,
that price reaction functions are upward sloping. If not, then rivals will react by lowering their prices. Such
a response would lower the profits of the firm signing the slotting allowance contract.
8See Salop (1986) for a general overview.
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her to less aggressive retail pricing. With legalized RPM, a retailer commits herself directly
to a retail price by choosing a price maintained product. In both cases rivals act on this
information in such a way as to raise profits for all. In a pricing game with upward sloping
reaction functions, commitment to a relatively high price induces each rival to raise her own
price. Their price increases then have positive first order feedback effects on the first firm's
profit.
Similar models are found elsewhere. In the principal - agent literature, Fershtman and
Judd (1984) show that non-cooperative owners can write compensation contracts for their
managers in such a way as to increase firm profits above the pre-contract Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, Bonanno and Vickers (1988) have shown that vertical separation dominates inte-
gration when manufacturers can set two - part tariffs and extract all the rent. Likewise it is
well known that sham innovations can be cross - licensed to achieve the collusive outcome.9
In addition to identifying slotting allowances and RPM as facilitating practices, I am also
able to rank the pair in terms of social welfare. Retailer prices and profits are found to be
higher with slotting allowances than with RPM. Furthermore, if RPM is observed, prices and
profits at the retail level will be greater when the coverage is incomplete, i.e. when not all
brands are price maintained. The result that downstream prices and profits are greater when
retailers commit to high marginal costs rather than to high prices directly seems somewhat
surprising.
RPM is an example of a contractual provision which inhibits a firm from reacting to
her competitors. Any retailer who chooses a price maintained product has tied her hands
regardless of her opponents' choice of prices. In a downstream duopoly, if both retailers
9See Shapiro 1985.
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choose RPM, neither can respond to the other's commitment. At equilibrium, prices and
profits are at the non-strategic Bertrand Nash outcome. If only one firm chooses RPM, the
other retains pricing flexibility. Industry prices and profits increase and welfare declines.10
If neither firm chooses RPM, both retailers have the ability to react strategically to their
rival. In the slotting allowances case, both firms sign contracts with high marginal costs and
both firms retain their pricing flexibility. This combination accounts for the relatively higher
profits and poorer welfare performance of this practice.
This chapter is organized in the following manner. Section ii presents the formal model.
Section iii derives the benchmark case where neither practice is allowed. Sections iv through
vi examine the two practices individually and in conjunction. Here I find that shelf space
rental fees lead to higher retail prices and profits and hence lower welfare performance than
RPM. Section vii summarizes the welfare results and explores the extent to which prices can
be raised in a linear demand framework. Section viii concludes with a policy discussion of
the implications of this research.
II The Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous product which is produced by a perfectly competitive
manufacturing industry and sold by a differentiated retail duopoly." Retailers are differenti-
ated in the sense that even though the product they sell is homogeneous, customers differ in
their store preference. Thus unequal retail prices do not cause demand at the higher priced
store to fall to zero. One familiar model in the literature is that of spatial competition.
"The outcome is similar to a Stackelberg price leader game.
"1The model would work equally well if I assumed a large number of symmetrically differentiated suppliers
vying for one available slot at each store. Competition among the upstream firms would ensure that no
producer could earn positive profit in equilibrium.
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Consumers are located between the two stores and incur positive transportation costs when
they buy. Here retailers are differentiated in a spatial sense. This is one justification for the
assumption, but there is no need to limit oneself to this explanation. Casual observation
should confirm that consumers have store preference. They may prefer store i's layout, park-
ing, carpet, music, sales personnel, etc. , or they may desire multiple products only some of
which store j has. However, not all consumers agree on their store preferences.1 2
Manufacturers compete to gain access to the retail level. I assume they are unable to
set up shop and sell independently. This is descriptive since most consumer goods are sold
through multiproduct retail outlets where overhead costs are diffused. Opening a single item
outlet would be prohibitively costly.
The precise form of the allowable supplier contracts will matter greatly in the ensuing
game. Attention is restricted to contracts which are not contingent on rival suppliers' prices
or quantities. Such contracts would almost surely be violating antitrust laws on horizontal
price fixing. Quantity discounts are allowed in the form of a two-part tariff. A negative fixed
fee corresponds to the slotting allowances observed in practice. In addition each producer
has the option to write a contract stipulating his product's resale price. Finally producers
may specify a clause prohibiting rival products from being sold at the same retail outlet.1 3
The game is played in three stages. In the first stage manufacturers simultaneously
announce the terms of their sales contracts. This will involve specifying the unit wholesale
price, the fixed fee coupled with the sole supplier clause, and the maintained price, if any.
Retailers then choose which producer to buy from and in the last stage compete in a non-
'2 A large marketing literature exists on retailer differentiation strategies. See Johnson (1987) for a survey.
13This last assumption is necessary to legally prohibit the retailer frorn accepting slotting allowances but
then not stocking the manufacturer 's product. Without this restriction, suppliers would not offer negative
fixed fees, since in a static one - shot game retailers cannot be trusted.
6
cooperative pricing game. Players at each stage choose their actions knowing the effects of
such actions on all succeeding stages. All information is common knowledge.
Demand Specification and Notation
Assumption 1 : Retail demand functions Di(P) are differentiable, downward sloping,
substitutes, and they satisfy the definiteness property.
D= < 0, Dj > 0, DiD - DjD > 0
where P = (P1, P2) is the vector of retail prices. Superscripts above the demand function
denote the retailer while subsripts indicate partial derivatives with respect to prices.
Assumption 2 : Let w, be the per unit wholesale cost and F; be the fixed fee specified
in the contract with retailer i's supplier. Then retailer i's profit is given by ri(P; w;, F;) =
(P - wi)Di(P) - F;. Furthermore let -= = - 4'i. I will assume
7r; < 0, 4 > 0, > D9= i 
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to prices. The first condition is
necessary for profit maximization. The second condition states that a firm's marginal profit
increases with her rival's price. This is critical to the analysis for it ensures that Bertrand
reaction functions slope upward. The last condition not only guarantees uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium,14 it also ensures that absent fixed fee transfers between a manufacturer
and his retailer, each retailer's equilibrium profit will be decreasing in her marginal cost w.15
Assumption 3 :Let c be the manufacturer's constant unit production cost. Then the
supplier k who sells to retailer i will earn profit denoted by rkw; F) = (w; - c)D'(P) + F;.
14See Friedman (1983).
isThis condition is satisfied with linear demands. In that case r;= 2Dj, iri = 4j = Dj, and
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III No RPM , No Slotting Allowances
In this section I derive equilibrium prices and profits assuming that RPM is illegal and that
producers are unwilling or unable to set fixed fee transfers (F; = 0). This case will be the
standard for future comparisons when these assumptions are relaxed.
Consider the stage-three pricing game. Each retailer chooses a supplier with a corre-
sponding wholesale price. The first order conditions for profit maximization are given by
jr; = (P; - w;)D:+ D =0 where the arguments of the demand function have been omitted
for brevity. From the assumptions, there exists a unique equilibrium in prices. Denote the
equilibrium price and profit vector when both retailers retain their pricing flexibility as
pBB = (PBB(w1,W2 ) P2B(wi, 2 )) , IB = (1(PBB;Fi = 0), r2 (PBB; F2 = 0))
Now look at the first two stages. To obtain shelf space at store i, a manufacturer must
offer the retailer a contract which will yield her at least as much in profit as she could get
by stocking another supplier's product. At the same time, the manufacturer will not offer
a contract which earns him negative profit. In equilibrium retailer i will choose to purchase
from a supplier who sets w to solve
max(PBB - w;)Di(PBB) s.t. (w; - c)D'(PBB) 0 (1)
Proposition 1 The equilibrium supplier contract has the transfer wholesale price equal to
supplier marginal cost (w; = c).
Proof : Set up the Lagrangian function and solve. It is easy to check that w2 = c will satisfy
the Kuhn - Tucker conditions. Using assumption 2, it can be shown that w; cannot exceed c.
Wholesale prices less than c violate the non-negative manufacturer profit constraint. Q.E.D.
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Since the upstream industry is perfectly competitive, no manufacturing firm will be able
to make positive profit. Any firm whose selling contract yielded it strictly positive profit
would lose retailer patronage because another upstream firm would be able to offer the
retailer higher profits by lowering his wholesale price. Thus the downstream firms have all
of the bargaining power and therefore will be able to extract all of the channel profit.
Denote the equilibrium price vector in the benchmark case as pB = (P3B(c, c), p 2BB(c, c))
and the profit vector 11B = (1(PB; F1 = 0), 7r2 (PB; F2 = 0)).
IV Slotting Allowances, No RPM
Now allow fixed fees.16 There is no restriction on their sign. The manufacturers announce
two-part tariff contracts subject only to earning non-negative profits. The retail pricing game
looks exactly as it did in the previous section. Retailer i's profit is given by (P;-w=) D' (P) - Fi
and the corresponding first order condition is it = (P - w;)Di + Di = 0. This yields
pBB = (PBB(wi,w 2),P 2BB(wi,w 2)).
In stage two each retailer will purchase from the supplier who enables her to earn the
highest profit. In equilibrium the supplier chosen by retailer i will be the one who has set
(w, F) to maximize his retailer's profit taking as given the other retailer's sales contract and
subject to earning non-negative profit.
max (PBB - w,)Di(PBB) - F s.t. (w; - c)Di(PBB) + F 0 (2)
Differentiating with respect to w and simplifying gives
[(BB)S+i]8P.BB gpBB
(P;" cDj Dj + (PfB - c)Dj ' = 0(3
16For a similar analysis see Bonanno and Vickers (1988). These authors have essentially derived Proposi-
tions 2 and 3 in the context of an upstream duopoly who sell to independent hornogeneous retailers.
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Substituting the retailer's profit maximizing condition for the term in brackets gives
. pBB a pBB
(w -- c )D) - = 0 (4)
8w c)D w;
By assumption 1, Di < 0 and Dj > 0. By totally differentiating the stage three retailer
first order conditions, one can show
8P.BB D= rO PBB Di ri.*B = D >01  p =-_ ->0 (5)
ewi A eawvA
Thus (4) can be separated into the negative direct effect of the loss in profit due to firm
i's own price increase, and the indirect positive effect in firm i's profits due to firm j's price
increase.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium supplier contract when two-part tariffs are allowed has wi >
c and Fi < 0.1
Proof: Suppose not. Then there are two cases to consider. Suppose w; = c. Then the first
term in (4) equals zero. But the second term is positive. Therefore w; 3 c. Suppose w, < c.
Then the first term in (4) is greater than zero. But this can only be a solution if pBB <c,
making the second term negative. If PBB < c, then F must be less than zero for the retailer
to be making profit. But then w; < c and F, < 0 which violates the manufacturer's break
even constraint. Q.E.D.
The intuition is straightforward. By committing herself to w; > c, retailer i gives retailer
j an incentive to raise her price. This has a positive first order effect on retailer i's profit.
The lost revenue from each sale is returned to the retailer through the slotting allowance she
receives. Retailer j has similar incentives. In equilibrium both retailers choose to commit
1 7See Bonanno and Vickers (1988), proposition 1.
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themselves to w > c. This enables them to raise their profits above the Nash level found in
the previous section. See proposition 3.
Let w' = (wi, wi) be the vector of Nash wholesale prices obtained in the slotting allowance
equilibrium. Denote prices and profits by
Ps = =pBBpBBS -(1(P;Fi),2(Ps;Ff))
Proposition 3 Retailer prices and profits are higher when manufacturers are able to use
slotting allowances to obtain shelf space than when they are not. That isP s> pB and
Us > 1B.1s
Proof: Since P 3B /wB andOwi > 0 and w aadnwd >,
P1 = P1 BB(wi, w) > PBB (w1,,c) > PBB 
(c, c) = PB
and similarly PZ > PP. To prove 11 S > 11 B, I first derive 9iri(PBB)18tv3 .
BB _ SP= 
P Bia S
iri(PB)/9w ,( Pf-w)Di + D' __ +(P - w )D (6)
D +() we
By the first order condition for retailer profit maximization, the first term equals zero. Hence
Bri(PBB)/aw, > 0 for all w. Now recall Elf = ir1 (PBB(u, wB), PB(w1, w2);Fi). Therefore
s> r1 (PiBB(c, ws),P2BB(c,w2 );F1 = 0) > 1 (PiIB(c, c),P 2BB(c, c);F1 =o) = 22 >
where the first inequality is by the definition of Nash equilibrium, and the second inequality
is true because airi(PBB)/8w3 > 0 as found above. A similar calculation shows fl > [If.
Q.E.D.
This analysis relies critically on the ability of retailer j to observe the details of retailer
i's contract. Formally if w; is not observed, then aPrE /8w; = 0 and the solution to (4) has
'8See Bonanno and Vickers (1988), proposition 2.
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wi = c. The game is played as if w and P were chosen simultaneously instead of sequentially.
Observability could be a serious problem, especially given the retailers' incentives to produce
bogus contracts, showing artificially high w's.19
Similarly, this analysis assumes away enforcement costs associated with retailer moral
hazard. Unrestricted cash bribes permit retailers to sign multiple contracts, collecting pay-
ments but selling only those goods which yield the greatest per-unit sale incentives. To
prevent this, manufacturers will insist on a sole supplier arrangement. Even so, monitoring
costs could be substantial. Explicit proof would be needed by third party enforcers. Infer-
ential evidence such as a decline in the injured supplier's sales would not be acceptable.20
Thus whether slotting allowances are observed in practice depends on both the retail-
ers' moral hazard and supplier monitoring costs as well as the observability of the supplier
contracts.
V RPM, No Slotting Allowances
In this section I allow contracts to include RPM, but assume fixed fees cannot be used.
There are three possibilities: RPM is not observed; RPM is used by both retailers; or RPM
is used by one retailer.
If RPM is not observed, then the results from section III apply. I found
pE = (B ,)pBB( )) B .1(PB;F1 =),r 2 pB;F2 = 0))
If RPM is observed at both stores, the stage three pricing game will be trivially deter-
mined. The retailers do, however, still choose from among the suppliers. An equilibrium
'9See Katz (1986) for a critique of observable contracts.
2 0Alternatively, I could have analyzed contracts which allowed quantity forcing. Such a contract would
specify a minimum sales transaction.
12
in stage three is one in which neither retailer has an incentive to change suppliers given
the other's choice. Thus the manufacturer who is stocked by retailer i will be the one who
has chosen (P, w) to maximize i's profit subject to his breakeven condition. Formally the
problem is
max(Pi - wi)Di(P;, P3) s.t (w= - c)D=(P,, P) ;> 0 (7)
Pt ,wi
Solving for the Nash equilibrium of this system yields w, = c, P = pB and I - 11 B. This
solution is precisely the same as the retailers' benchmark Nash equilibrium in their pricing
game of section III. Without the use of fixed fees and the opportunity for strategic play
that they give, two manufacturers simultaneously and non-cooperatively maximizing their
retailer's profits can do no better than the retailers can themselves. Thus the case in which
RPM is used by both retailers is equivalent to the benchmark case when neither RPM nor
fixed fees were allowed.
Lastly, consider the case in which RPM is used at one outlet. Begin by considering the
stage three pricing game for the firm not using RPM. Suppose firm 1 uses RPM. Retailer 2's
maximization is given by maxp2 (P2 -w 2 )D
2 (P1, P2 ). Her first order condition is (P2 -w 2)Dj+
D2 = 0. Solving for retailer 2's price when retailer 1 has RPM gives pMB = P2 (Piw2).
The manufacturers' game can now be split into two parts. First, consider the producer
who is chosen by retailer 2. The producer so chosen will have maximized
(P2MB - w2)D 2 (P1, B) s.t. (w2 - c)D2(P1, P2"B) > 0 (8)
It is easy to verify that w2 = c satifies the Kuhn - Tucker conditions. The intuition behind
this result is simple. It says that when faced with an opponent, retailer 1, whose hands
are tied (her price is contractually determined), the best strategy is to retain maximum
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flexibility by buying at the lowest wholesale price available. There is no commitment value
in choosing w2 > c. The only reason to have done so would have been to induce P1 to be
higher. This is not possible when retailer 1 has chosen RPM.
Now consider retailer l's supplier. To secure his place on the shelf he must choose P1 to
maximize retailer 1's profits subject to his zero profit condition. Formally, P1 is chosen to
maximize (P1 - c)D1 (p1 , PMf(P 1, w2 )). The first order condition gives
a PM
[(Pi- c)Di + Di] + (P1i- c)Di 28, =0 (9)
Without the second term, and with c substituted for w2, the solution would give PB. But
(9) says that i's supplier takes into account retailer 2's price response. The second term will
be positive if and only if 8P2B/0P1 > 0. This can easily be verified by applying the implicit
function theorem to retailer 2's first order condition.
8PM - [(P2 -w 2 )D3 1 + D ] - >,2 P ( 2 - w2 D= 2 > 0 
(10)
1 (P2 - 2)D 2 +2D2 2
Because of the second term the manufacturer will choose Pi > pB(c, c). At P1 = p B(c, c),
pMB = PBB(c,c), and (pBB - c)Di + Di = 0. The positive second term indicates that
profit can be increased with a higher P1. Therefore let Pp' solve (9). Then the downstream
equilibrium prices and profits when firm 1 chooses RPM and firm 2 remains flexible can be
denoted
pM = (PVt, P2MB(P 1MB4 ,) UM = (*(PM; F1 = 0), xi2(PM; F2 = 03)).
The following two lemmas establish that prices and profits for both retailers will be higher
in this case than in the benchmark case. These results will be used to show that the scenario
where neither retailer chooses RPM cannot be an equilibrium of the game.
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lemma 1 P2 M(p1B, c) > p23B(c,c)
Proof: By the definition of a Nash equilibrium P2B1(c, c) = P2 fB(P1B(c, c), c). It was shown
that PfB > PB(c, c). Since PMB/8P1 > 0, PMB(PAB, c) > PBB(c, c). Q.E.D.
lemma 2 JIM > HB
Proof: This is a standard result in the literature on price leader and follower games. In this
model the firm choosing RPM acts as a price leader while the uncommitted firm is the price
follower. Both retailers earn higher profits than in the benchmark case with simultaneous
play.
Proposition 4 At least one retailer will choose to price maintain her product when RPM
is legal and fixed fees are not allowed.
Proof: Suppose not. If retailer 2's supplier is charging w = c, and not maintaining her
retail price, other suppliers will compete to set dealer l's price at P[fB and charge c per unit
good. By lemma 2, the resulting profit to retailer 1, I 1', is greater than IIB. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 Retail prices and profits are higher vis a vis the benchmark case when RPM
is legalized and coverage is incomplete, i.e. one firm chooses not to use RPM.
Proof: This follows immediately from lemmas 1 and 2. Q.E.D.
Since incomplete RPM coverage Pareto dominates price maintenance at both outlets in
the two player game, it can be argued that the former outcome will be observed. Suppose
retailer 1 were forced to choose RPM, but retailer 2 had free choice. With pre-play communi-
cation the reasoning is as follows : retailer 1 tells retailer 2 that she will choose Pi1 = P1 M. If
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she is believed, "2" will choose no RPM and w2 = c. Knowing this, "1" will play P1 = PMB.
So far, this is just her half of the Nash equilibrium. But simultaneously retailer 2 will be
saying to "1" that she will choose no RPM, w2 = c. Given this, "1" will choose P1 = P1B.
Therefore the case where both retailers impose RPM is not likely to be observed.
The intuition in this section generally and in proposition 5 in particular is that legal-
izing RPM is tantamount to allowing retailers to commit to prices. In their attempts to
secure retail shelf space, the manufacturers act to increase downstream profits by finding the
Stackelberg pricing equilibrium. Both prices and profits will be higher as a result.
VI With RPM and Slotting Allowances
In this section, I allow producers to include fixed fees and RPM as part of their sales contracts.
As before there are three possibilities: either zero, one, or both firms will use RPM. Before
proceeding to characterize the equilibria in this section, the following two lemmas will prove
useful.
lemma 3 If retailer 2 chooses a two-part tariff contract, retailer 1 will be indifferent between
a supplier who maximizes her profit by RPM and a supplier who maximizes her profit via a
two-part tariff.
Proof: I will show that a solution to the first order conditions of one maximization problem
will also solve the first order conditions of the second maximization problem.
Consider a supplier who maximizes retailer 1's profits by setting P1. His problem is
maxp1 (P1 - c)D1 (P1 , P2IB (P1, w2 )). The first order condition is given by (9). Substituting
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the expression for BPfB/0 P1 and rearranging gives
[(P1 - c)Di (P1,P 2MB(P1,w2)) +Dl (p1, p2MB (P1,w 2 ))] 2 (11)
- (P1 - c)D (P1 ,PfB(P1 ,w 2)) r1 = 0
Let P1 = P 1 solve this equation.
Now consider a supplier who maximizes retailer 1's profits by setting wi and F1 . His
problem is
max (p 1BBwi,w 2) -wi) Di (PjBB(wi, w2 ), P B(w 1 ,w 2 )) - F1  (12)
tui,F1i
s.t. (w1 - c)Di (PfB(wi, w2 ), PBB(w1, 2 )) + F1 = 0
The first order condition is
[(p 1BB - c) D I (P ea, p B) 1 + D ' ( pBBp 2BB)]a
+ (PaB - c) D2 (PBB, PB) a 2  0 (13)
Substituting the expressions for BPfB/dwi and BP B/8w1 and rearranging gives
[(pBB - c) D (PBBpfBB) + D' (p 1BB,p 2BB)]
- ( -(PB- D(P 1 BBPB) 4 = 0 (14)
Now compare (12) and (14). By setting wi such that PBB(w1,w 2) = P 1 and recalling that
2P (w10, 2) =P 1 (Pj(w 1 , w2), w2) by the definition of PZe, the solutions to (12) will
also be solutions to (14) and vice versa. Plugging P1 and PBB(wi, w2) into their respective
profit functions, it is seen that retailer 1 will be indifferent between the two cases. Q.E.D.
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lemrrma 4 If retailer 1 chooses an RPM contract, retailer 2 will be be indifferent between a
supplier who maximizes her profit by RPM and a supplier who maximizes her profit via a
two-part tariff.
Proof: As before I will show that the solution to the first order conditions of one maximiza-
tion problem will also solve the first order conditions of the second maximization problem.
Consider a supplier who maximizes retailer 2's profit by setting P2. His problem is
maxp2(P2 - c)D2 (Pi, P2). Let P2 = P2 be the solution.
Now consider a supplier who maximizes retailer 2's profit by setting w2 and F2. His
problem is
max (PIB(P1, w2 ) - w2) D2 (P1 ,p sB(P1,w 2 )) - F2  (15)
s.t. (w2 - c)D2 (P1 ,PB(P 1,w 2)) -- F2 = 0
By setting w2 such that PM B(P 1 , w2 ) = P2, the solution to the RPM maximization problem
can be replicated. Similarly, by setting a maintained price equal to P B (P1 , w2), the solution
to the two-part tariff maximization problem can be replicated. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 There are three equilibrium outcomes in the game in which fixed fees and
RPM are allowed.
Proof: Consider the three possibilities. If RPM is not observed, then by application of
lemma three, the slotting allowance outcome of section IV is an equilibrium. It is also
unique.
From lemma four, the outcome in which both retailers choose RPM and price at the
benchmark level is an equilibrium. Allowing fixed fees when RPM is used by both stores is
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of no consequence since the wholesale price set equal to supplier marginal cost is sufficient
to extract producer surplus.
Using lemmas three and four, the outcome found in section V in which only one retailer
chooses RPM is also an equilibrium when fixed fees are allowed. It is easy to show that the
retailer who remains price flexible will choose to buy at w = c and F = 0. Likewise the
retailer using RPM does not need a fixed fee to capture her supplier's profit.
Therefore the three outcomes are: both retailers choose slotting allowance contracts with
prices and profits (PS, HS); both retailers choosing RPM contracts with prices and profits
(PB, iB); and only one retailer choosing RPM with prices and profits (PM, IIM). Q.E.D.
I have shown that when both retailers sign slotting allowance contracts, retail prices will
be higher and sales lower relative to the benchmark case where producer wholesale prices
were set at marginal cost.
I have also shown that when both retailers choose resale price maintenance, the outcome
will replicate the benchmark case, whereas if only one firm uses RPM, prices and profits will
be higher for both firms.
The next step is to compare prices and profits in the slotting allowances equilibrium with
the corresponding values when RPM is observed at only one store. The following proposition
will assess this case.
Consider the case where both retailers receive slotting allowances. Define w; = r;(w3 ) to
be retailer i's profit maximizing wholesale price when j has chosen wj. If dr,/dw, > 0, then
i's producer wholesale price reaction function is said to be upward sloping.2 '
21This will be true with linear demands. Implicitly differentiating (4) gives dr1/dw, =
(OB"/Ow)DjDJ/(2DIID - (OPBB/8wi)DjDi) > 0 by assumption 1. In general, the expression for
dri/dw, will contain third derivatives of the retail profit functions and cannot be signed.
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Proposition 7 If producer wholesale price reaction functions are upward sloping, retailer
prices and profits are higher in the slotting allowance equilibrium than they are in the equi-
librium where one retailer chooses RPM. That is PS > pM and US> 1gM.
Proof: Recall PM = (P1B, P2B). By lemma 3 this equals (PfB(ij 1 , c), p2BB(ij 1 , c)) where
wi = r1(c). Ps -=(PBB(wi), P2B(wwsw)) where wi = r1(w;) and wi = r 2(ws). Since
wz > c, w1 > 15 if dr/dw > 0. Furthermore BPBB/aw1 and BPBB /w 2 > 0 for all w, by
(5). Therefore Ps > pM.
Now consider retailer profits.
HP1 = w1(Pfd, PMB(PiMB, c); F1 = 0)
- .1 (P1BBQj 1 pBc), PMB(pB(jju1, c), c);T1) by lemma 3
= 71 (pBB (5 1 , c), PBB (w 1, c); A) by Nash equilibrium
< i.1 (Pf(U1, W2),PBB(51, wz);P1) since ar 1/w 2 > 0 by (12)
< ir (PB)P B(ww) Fr) since wi = r 1(w4)
Similarly an analogous proof applies for L1i > llK. Q.E.D.
Since the slotting allowance equilibrium Pareto dominates both RPM equilibrium out-
comes, an argument similar to the one given earlier provides an intuitive basis for predicting
the observance of rental fees. With pre-play communication, both players will be announc-
ing their slotting allowance preferences. Given the other's announcement, both players will
indeed choose w = w". Therefore, unless there are observability or monitoring problems
associated with the high wholesale prices that come with these contracts, I would not expect
to see RPM used in the two player game when slotting allowances are legal.
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RPM directly commits a firm to a retail price. If both retailers choose RPM, neither
can react to her opponent's price. Any advantage of commitment in the penultimate stage
is lost, since the pricing game is trivialized. With incomplete coverage, one firm commits
itself to a pre-specified price while the second firm is free to react accordingly. Retail prices
and profits are higher in this case. With slotting allowances, both retailes commit to high
marginal costs, and in the final stage both firms can react to the other's commitment. This
combination leads to even higher downstream prices. Thus prices and profits will be highest
if both firms are playing a puppy dog strategy. Welfare is lowest in this case.
VII Welfare
So far the analysis has shown (PS, HS) > (pM,JIM) > (PB, 1 B). The implication is that
both slotting allowances and RPM lower welfare. But important questions remain. By how
much do prices rise with RPM (slotting allowances)? In what way do the price differences
depend on the perceived differentiation of the retailers? How does the magnitude of the
welfare decline compare with the welfare performance of a retail cartel? As a start in
answering these questions, I will need to specify a functional form of demand.
Let Dt(P) = (1/2)(V-(1+y)Pi+yP). Demand is then characterized by the substitution
parameter -y > 0. For unit increases in Pi , firm i loses 1 + in sales. Of this y sales will
be diverted to firm j. Thus 'y/(l + 'y) represents the increase in j's sales as a fraction of i's
lost sales. When 7y = 0, no sales will be diverted; each retailer is a monopolist. As -y -4 oo
the retailers become perfect substitutes. Demand is assumed to be symmetric to simplify
computation.
Prices and profits will be calculated for each scenario. These will then be compared
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with each other and with the hypothetical cartel solution. Next a simple index of price
performance is developed to gain further perspective on the magnitude of the various price
markups. Finally I will look explicitly at social welfare and consider when the use of RPM
and slotting allowances will lead to the worst outcomes.
Competitive case : When neither practice is allowed non-cooperative equilibrium retail prices
and profits are found by the simultaneous solution to the first order conditions ii = (P -
wi)D: + Di = 0. Straightforward computations give
PB -PBB(c,c)= V +(1 +-Y)c ; 2B-I(PB;Fi-= 0 (+c7) 2
2 +,yi0 2(2+,y) 2
for both retailers. Policy discussion should focus around this case since it is the first best
from society's viewpoint.
Slotting Allowance case: If both firms choose slotting allowances, one can show that each
retailer will have




Incomplete RPM Coverage case: When RPM is observed at one retail outlet, the equilibrium
outcome can be calculated as
pM_pMB _ (2+37)V+(2+57 + _27 2 )c
1 1 2(2 +47 +72)
pM = pMB pMB c)_ (4 + 1Oy+ 57 2 )V +(4 +14 7 +15 7 2 + 473 )c
4(1 +y7)(2 + 47+y72 )
IIM.= W(PM; FO ) = (2+ 37)2 (V -c) 2
16(1 + 7)(2 +47 +72)
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I2 = 7r 2 (PM; F = 0) = (4 + 10y + 57 2 )2 (V -c)2
32(1 +y)( 2 + 4 'y +y2)2
Cartel case: This case was not considered earlier, but it is useful to derive for comparison
sake. Suppose both firms could cooperate and achieve the collusive outcome. They would
find the optimal PC and IC to be
V + c c (V -c) 2
2 ' 8
I will now compare the alternative cases. Some simple conclusions can be summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 8 When -y = 0, all prices and profits are equal to the cartel outcome. For
given 7 > 0, (Pc, JJc) > (PS, US) > (pM, JIM) > (PB, IB). With the exception of the cartel
outcome, all prices and profits are monotonically decreasing in 7. Finally, marginal cost
pricing and zero profits prevail as 7 -+ oo.
These results can be easily verified. As the retailers become more homogeneous, their non-
cooperative ability to sustain P > c and JI > 0 declines. At the extreme points the expected
cartel and Bertrand pricing homogeneous product outcomes arise , while for intermediate 7,
the cases can be unambiguously ranked as found in the earlier theory.
What about the magnitude of the price markups? For given V, c, and y the exact prices
can be determined for each case. Price differences and percentage markups could then be
found. However this is a cumbersome method. By constructing a simple price index, the
need to consider V and c is eliminated, thereby allowing one to focus on how the markups
change with respect to 7. Define
I1= P - where P= (PB PM Ps)
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This index looks at the absolute markup of the equilibrium price over supplier marginal cost
divided by the markup of the collusive price over supplier marginal cost. Since P < PC,
0 < I < 1. As -y -+ oo, I -+ 0 and as y -+ 0, I--+ 1. This formulation is convenient to use
since it abstracts from V and c. As I increases, industry performance decreases.
Table 1 presents results from selected y. The numbers at the top of the table correspond
to individual values of y. The rows correspond to the respective index calculations. 1 B
represents the competitive case. I represents firm i in the non-universal coverage RPM
case. Is corresponds to the slotting allowance case.
Insert table 1 here
When y = 18, (95% of firm i's lost sales are diverted to firm j when i's price increases)
non- cooperative competition, barring both practices, leads to prices which are 10% of the
distance between the cartel and perfect competition points. With RPM the price maintained
firm extends this to 14.1% while her competitor has a scaled markup of 11.9%. With slot-
ting allowances the equilibrium prices are marked up by 17.4%. When -y = 38 (97% sales
diversion), the benchmark case has a scaled markup of 5%. Slotting allowances would lead
to a 9.3% markup, while the RPM case leads to a 7.3% and 6.1% markup for the RPM firm
and her rival respectively.
Such calculations are meant to be illustrative of the magnitude of price rises one could
expect under different regimes. Alternatively one could focus on the precise welfare differ-
ences among the various scenarios. Price rises in themselves only signal decreases in welfare.
One may ask when the resulting welfare decline is greatest. Are the gains to challenging
these shelf space practices more when retailers have a high product substitution or a low
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one?
To answer this, I need to consider the form of the utility function. Ignoring income effects,
and aggregating the preferences of consumers, the linear demands used in this chapter can
be derived from the following quadratic function. 2 2
1 2 2u2  2
U = Vq - -q2 _ _ p
2 1 + 2y
where q = D1 + D 2 and ff2 = D1D2)2. Defining social welfare as the sum of consumer
surplus and profits, gives SW = Vq-} q2 - 22 -c q. Let SW be the percent change
in welfare when moving from the competitive case to either the slotting (ASWs) or RPM
case (ASWM).
Proposition 9 ASWs ZASWM 0 with equality at -y = 0 and y = oo.
These results can be verified by straightforward algebra. For all -y between 0 and oo,
welfare declines when either or both practices are allowed. The change in welfare is zero
when -y = 0 or -y = oo. At y = 0 the retailers are already able to reach the monopoly
outcome. The price enhancing features of slotting allowances or RPM are not needed. At
-y = oo, price increases above cost cannot be sustained as consumers view the two retailers
as perfect substitutes.
When will society be hurt most by the shelf space practices? Minimizing ASW with
respect to -y, one can show that welfare decline is greatest when 'y a 2. This is true for both
the slotting allowance and RPM cases. Figures 1 and 2 depict ASW when 0 y 40.
The vertical axes measure the percent change in utility. With linear demands the gains to
barring both practices increases rapidly as -y goes from 0 to 2 and thereafter declines in a
22See Shubik (1980).
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logarithmic fashion. At their worse, the social welfare loss relative to the competitive case
is 3% and 1.4% for the slotting allowance and RPM cases respectively.
By comparison, figure 3 shows the percent welfare loss of the cartel case relative to the
competitive case. This loss can reach as high as 25%. Thus although RPM and slotting
allowances increase retail prices, their loss is small by comparison.
VIII Conclusion
I have analyzed slotting allowances and RPM in a model where producers in a perfectly
competitive industry compete to obtain shelf space at the retail level. Barring contract
observability problems, slotting allowances will be observed in equilibrium. Producers charge
a high wholesale price, but give back their profits via up-front payments to retailers. However
if the individual supplier - retailer wholesale price terms are unobservable by rivals, then
resale price maintenance will be seen, but the coverage will not be universal. If neither RPM
or slotting allowances are available, then the equilibrium entails marginal cost wholesale
pricing.
The three equilibria can be ranked by the usual social welfare criteria. Marginal cost
wholesale pricing without RPM yields the greatest surplus, while the slotting allowance
equilibrium gives the worst performance.
Policy issues are usually complex. Slotting allowances are now legal. RPM is currently
per-se illegal. One theme of this paper is that the two practices are substitutable. It
contributes to the policy debate by demonstrating that both RPM and slotting allowances
can be thought of as facilitating practices.
Conventional wisdom suggests that RPM may correct for service externalitites and pro-
26
tect against information free - riding and that slotting allowances may help to improve
product selection by downstream retailers who are uncertain of demand. It is shown here
that these efficiency claims must be balanced against the possible price raising potential of
these practices through their strategic use.
I
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